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✈ Possible collision scenario
at holding point
Graphics: CIAIAC
✈ Map
Graphics: Google Earth
Spain’s CIAIAC released their report in their bulletin 02/2012,
page 212 and following, concluding:
The incident resulted from the crew of the Ryanair B737’s
misjudging of the distances as it passed behind the B767,
which was stopped at the G3 position of the runway 25L
holding point.
Assigning position G3 to an aircraft with a long fuselage,
such as a B767-300, and the position of said aircraft, relatively
far away from the holding point marking, contributed
to the incident.
The defi ciencies in the communications between the cabin
and fl ight crews on the B737 resulted in the collision going
unnoticed and in both aircraft continuing with their fl ights
without an assessment of the damage produced.
The CIAIAC reported the American Airlines Boeing 767-300
was positioned on holding point G3 (the most western holding
point) about 16 meters short of the hold short line stating:
“From the pilot’s point of view, the main concern is not
to interfere with aircraft circulating on the runway at any
time. A pilot will therefore give priority to this consideration
over any potential problems involving tailing aircraft, and
will keep the holding point marking well in sight and ahead
of the nose of the airplane, barring any instruction to the
contrary from ATC.”
The CIAIAC reported neither of the Boeing 767-300 crew got
aware of the contact between the aircraft, especially they did
not notice any movement that would by typical for a collision.
When the B738 crew refused to continue to taxi before
the B763 had moved, they moved about 10 feet forward.
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The CIAIAC reported the B738 captain had asked the fi rst offi
cer to verify separation to the Boeing 767-300 as they were
passing along. She steered the aircraft about half a meter to
the left of the taxiway center line to ensure separation. The
fi rst offi cer indicated there was no concern as the wing-tip
passed the tail cone of the 767 however he asked to stop
immediately when the wing tip approached the end of the
left hand horizontal stabilizer. The captain rose out of her
seat to assess the situation and was surprised about the
short distance, the fi rst offi cer assured however the aircraft
had not made contact. Shortly thereafter the intercom rang
(single chime only, company policy requiring three chimes in
case of a serious problem) and the fl ight attendant said “for
your information” leaving the captain under the impression
only one passenger had reported contact between the aircraft
– she continued to say in the interview that had she
been aware of multiple passengers observing the collision
she would have reacted differently.
After returning the Barcelona both fl ight crew believed the
contact must have happened before stopping.
The CIAIAC released one safety recommendation to Spain’s
AENA to reassess the taxi limitations on taxiway K and holding
points G.
The CIAIAC also released one safety recommendation to
Ryanair to “reassess those aspects of its training program
involving fl ight and cabin crew communications and address
the defi ciencies noted, if any. Special emphasis should be
placed on the benefi ts to safety that stem from the effective
transmission of information from the passenger cabin to the
fl ight deck.”
der fl ugleiter 2012/04
49