Studieordning for Filosofi og Videnskabsteori - ACE Denmark

But, as I asked: can the intent of forcing intercourse
ever be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, and if ‘yes’, then how? This is obviously
an epistemological question that we can
and should pay interest to as philosophers.
Let us begin with the ‘easy’ case – man jumps
out from behind a tree, pushes over a woman
and forces intercourse. Is this rape? The answer
is clearly – ‘yes’! In order to prove this
the first thing that is needed is proof that intercourse
actually did take place between defendant
and victim. Today the burden of proof on
this point has been relieved by the use of DNA
evidence. Next, it needs to be proven that the
woman did not consent. Given the description
of the situation this clearly indicates to the
judges and lay judged that consent was not
given. But does this mean that it has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt that defendant
is guilty? No, because in principle he still
could have believed that she wanted to have
intercourse or had consented. This raises the
question of how his intent of forcing intercourse
can be proven if, though unlikely, he
were to deny. Obviously, we cannot open his
skull with a can opener, rewind the tape, and
observe the intention.
Notice, that here the question does not pertain
to whether it is a case of rape, but rather
whether the defendant is guilty of rape. Further,
the only one with access to the evidence
is the defendant himself, as his intention at the
time of the crime cannot be inferred from either
the intercourse or the lack of consent. The
former merely shows that intercourse occurred
and the latter merely shows that the woman
was forced into this. But whether he believed
that the woman had consented or not is another
question.
At this point, it becomes crucial to consider
how the court considers intent to be proven
beyond ‘reasonable doubt’. To prove intent
beyond ‘reasonable doubt’ is defined as proving
that there would be no ‘reasonable doubt’
in the mind of a reasonable person that the
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defendant had the intention in question. Thus,
in the light of denial of the necessary intention,
such a proof is reached by one of the two
possible courses of interpretation of such denial;
namely, declaring the defendant as untrustworthy,
interpreting his testimony as a lie.
Quoting the Minister of justice (2005): ‘if an
offender makes use of violence or threats of
violence, he will most likely not doubt that the
woman is not consenting’. But obviously, this
is only the case in so far as the defendant himself
is regarded as a reasonable person. The
other possible interpretation, then, is that of
actually believing the defendant when he
claims that he did believe the woman wanted
to have sex with him or that she had consented.
But as such a belief would be reasonable
on no accounts, the defendant would be
declared insane and convicted to treatment.
In cases of ‘blitz rape’ like this, such reconstruction
of intention seems unproblematic.
But in the controversial cases with which I
began problems immediately arise since the
claimed beliefs may not as readily be dismissed
offhand as invented for the occasion,
or reserved to the mentally deranged. Did the
men in the case of the ‘kinky’ wife not have
reason to believe that the wife actually had
consented despite her resistance? Did the bikers
not believe that the young woman actually
consented when she lied down on the beach?
Did the husband not have reason to believe
that the wife consented, when she said so?
Due to this problem the Danish courts do not
consider the necessary intention to be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, why the defendants
are not guilty in the required judicial sense
and therefore go free.
Negligent rape
It is in particular in cases of acquaintance
rape that this problem may be expected to
apply. The way this problem will appear to the
victim may also explain why it is this category
to which most unreported rapes are thought to
belong. It is probably also here then, that the
main answer to my earlier question, as to